«This volume collects the papers presented at the "Mind, Language, and the First-Person Perspective" International Conference and School of Philosophy held at the Faculty of Philosophy, San Raffaele University, from 20 to 30th September 2021. The Conference was organized by the San Raffaele PRIN Research Unit within the "Mark of the Mental" (MOM) Research Project, with the collaboration of the San Raffaele Research Centre in Experimental and Applied Epistemology and the San Raffaele Research Centre in Phenomenology and Sciences of the Person. MOM is an interdisciplinary research project funded by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research, and focused on whether the mental is a homogeneous domain of phenomena unified under some properties that all and only mental entities (events, states, properties) possess. The quest for what is called the "mark of the mental" characterizes both metaphysical and conceptual approaches as well as more scientifically oriented strands of research, in an effort to circumscribe the "mental realm" by distinguishing what is genuinely mental from what is not. MOM's core research questions - Do mental phenomena have an intrinsic nature? What makes it the case that mental events, states, and properties are mental? - have long been debated in philosophy. The phenomenological tradition, pioneered by Brentano and Husserl, has taken two different (albeit connected) properties of the mental to play the mark-role. For Brentano, such a role is played by intentionality, i.e. the property of being about something or having a content, which he notoriously characterized by using the label "intentionale Inexistenz". By contrast, for Husserl (as for Descartes before him), the mark-role is played by consciousness, i.e. the property of having a phenomenal character. In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, both theories have been revived. Scholars have moved either in an intentionalist direction, holding that all mental states - even those that are paradigmatically phenomenal such as moods or bodily feelings - are ultimately intentional, since their phenomenal character is either identical or supervenient on their intentionality. Or they have moved in the opposite, conscientialist direction, holding that consciousness (in particular phenomenal consciousness) takes pride of place, either by reducing intentionality itself to a conscious property - phenomenal intentionality - or by taking all mental states as qualified by phenomenology, be it sensory (affecting sensations, emotions, and moods) or cognitive (affecting beliefs, expectations, and desires)...» (From the introduction)